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Abstract: There is a consensus among scholars that overvalued exchange rates result in 
currency crises. This paper estimates the equilibrium real exchange rate for Turkey and 
finds that the lira was indeed overvalued before the crises in 1994 and 2001. However, 
the actual real exchange rate is at present close to the equilibrium level, exposing the 
myth propagated by the Turkish exporters that lira’s overvaluation is responsible for 
Turkey’s uncompetitive exports. The paper also highlights the role for fiscal adjustment 
in macroeconomic stability.    
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1. Introduction  
 
Even though long-run equilibrium real exchange rates are a function of real 
variables only, actual real exchange rates respond to both real and monetary variables 
(Edwards 1989). The departure of actual real exchange rate from the equilibrium level in 
the short and medium run due to short run frictions and adjustment costs is common. 
However, certain deviations from the equilibrium level could become persistent through 
time leading to misalignments. The literature has found exchange rate misalignment 
(namely, overvalued exchange rate) as an important predictor of currency crises (see 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998 and the literature cited within). The huge costs 
that these misalignments impose in the form of currency crises make it impossible for 
policymakers to overlook the problem. Turkey’s crises in the last decade bear a testimony 
to the devastation caused by such crises.   
An overvalued exchange rate causes domestic exports to become uncompetitive in 
the world markets and puts pressure on governments for protectionism. Turkish exporters 
have recently raised their concerns alleging that the overvalued lira is making the Turkish 
exports uncompetitive. Similarly, the U.S. exporters are holding China’s undervalued 
currency responsible for their huge current account deficits and for prolonging of the 
recession in the United States. In the wake of the Asian currency crisis in 1997, some 
emerging countries expressed concern about losing competitiveness to the Asian 
countries since the Asian currencies experienced huge devaluations. Hence, ascertaining 
the equilibrium exchange rate, and hence the extent of misalignment, is important in 
determining the competitiveness of the economy. This is especially relevant in the case of 
Turkey, given its customs union and accession negotiations with the European Union. An 
overvalued exchange rate could indeed push Turkey into a severe balance of payments 
crisis. Turkey has had a Customs Union with the European Union since 1996. This 
customs union did indeed help Turkey boost its exports by 5 % since 1996. In its recent 
meeting with the European Council in December 2004, the council was pleased with the 
progress Turkey is making towards the convergence criteria and has requested to open 
negotiations in October 2005 (Europa, 2004a). However, European Union has repeatedly 
stressed that the accession would not take place before 2014. (Europa, 2004b) Therefore, 
Turkey will be under a great pressure to sustain its good economic record as well as to 
continue political reforms.  
In the event of misaligned exchange rates, policymakers often find themselves 
entrapped in a dilemma – external competitiveness or internal stability (fiscal and price 
stability). In the case of Turkey, policymakers have to weigh the need for devaluation to 
boost exports (if exchange rate is indeed overvalued) versus keeping inflation low 
because the share of imported raw materials and capital goods in total imports is high 
(Guncavdi and Orbay, 2001). Kalkan (2002) finds that increasing rates of depreciation 
cause real depreciations, which he interprets as a dilemma for the government. If the 
government wants to control inflation by controlling the rate of depreciation, it has to 
accept the appreciation of real exchange rate and therefore deterioration of trade balance. 
While an appreciated exchange rate keeps the level of foreign debt low, devaluation leads 
to high interest rates (through uncovered interest parity) thus increasing the debt level.  
In order to solve the policy dilemma, we feel the need to estimate the equilibrium 
real exchange rate for Turkey to assess if the recent crises in 1994 and 2001 were caused   3
by overvalued exchange rate and to test the claim of the Turkish exporters that the 
overvalued exchange rate is making the Turkish economy uncompetitive. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief account of Turkey’s economic 
history. Section 3 reviews the literature on Turkish exchange rate. Section 4 describes the 
theoretical underpinnings for our empirical model. Section 5 presents the estimation and 
the results from the error correction models. Section 6 estimates the equilibrium real 
exchange rate for Turkey. Section 7 concludes with policy implications in light of the 
recent monetary policy.  
 
2. Turkey’s economic history  
 
Prior to the stabilization program in 1980, Turkey followed a highly protective 
and inward-looking policy, plagued with inflationary pressures. Under this strategy, 
domestic producers enjoyed protection while multiple exchange rate practices were in 
place to favor imports of inputs for domestic industry. The economy performed well until 
the late 1970s, when worsening of inflation and current account was aggravated by the 
increasing public deficits and the two oil crises, thereby creating pressure on the 
exchange rate. Foreign borrowing was used extensively to finance current account 
deficits. High inflation along with a fixed exchange rate led to losses in competitiveness 
and a balance of payments crisis in 1977-78. However, the post-1980 period witnessed a 
policy of abolition of most price controls, continual real depreciation (at least until the 
end of 1989) to boost exports and liberalization of exchange and payments system (see 
Asikoglu and Uctum, 1992, and Erol and van Wijnbergen, 1997 for description of the 
exchange rate policy). By late 1980s, both current account and capital account were 
liberalized.  
In the early years of the program, impressive growth rates, burgeoning exports 
and falling inflation rate together with improved fiscal position created a buoyant 
economic environment. However, after 1987, Turkey experienced the boom-bust cycles, 
resembling the Southern Cone experience – using exchange rate for stabilizing inflation, 
without correcting the underlying budget deficits – which would result in speculative 
attacks (see Calvo and Vegh, 1999, for a survey). Trade liberalization led to unwanted 
consequences on the trade balance because it was not supported by appropriate fiscal 
corrections (Kale, 2001). High public deficits kept interest rates high, which led to 
appreciation of the lira and burgeoning current account deficits, which culminated in the 
financial collapse in 1994.  
The 1994 financial collapse led to the adoption of a stabilization and structural 
adjustment program, consisting of fiscal retrenchment to reduce inflation and to improve 
the external balance (Kale, 2001). However, political uncertainties, combined with loose 
fiscal and monetary policies, undermined the credibility of the disinflation program. 
In 1999, the newly established government embarked on a new disinflation 
program. The program in essence was an exchange rate based stabilization program (with 
a fixed exit date). The program also aimed at fiscal discipline and structural reforms. 
Exchange rate was predetermined in line with the targeted inflation rate. Liquidity 
creation by the central bank was tied to the foreign exchange purchases.
2 
The initial effects of the program were typical in that inflation slowed down, 
interest rates declined, consumption boomed and current account deficit surmounted. The   4
program relied on the sustainability of capital inflows. Like the 1994 crisis, banks 
borrowed recklessly from abroad with short maturities. After capital began to flow out, 
the fragile banking sector was pushed into a banking crisis in November of 2000. The 
loss of confidence precipitated the currency crisis of February 2001. As a result, Turkish 
authorities decided to let the lira float. From then on, the program has been implemented 
under a floating exchange rate regime.
3  
After one and half decade of economic instability in the Turkish economy, the 
recent stable performance has raised hopes. Inflation has declined from 45% in 2002 to 
25% in 2003 – mainly due to the appreciation of the lira. However, increasing current 
account deficits and short term capital inflows are causing concerns. In addition, 
“overvalued lira” has become the center stage of discussions in the economic circle. Our 
aim in this paper is to estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate to test if overvalued lira 
was responsible for the crises in 1994 and 2001 and also to test the claim about present 
overvaluation of the lira.  
 
3. Literature Review 
 
We admit that ours is not the first study examining the equilibrium real exchange 
rate in Turkey, but it is the only paper that estimates the equilibrium using the correct 
methodology. We now review some of the empirical studies on Turkish real exchange 
rate and point to their shortcomings. Alper and Saglam (2000) estimate the equilibrium 
using cointegration method – the study is flawed in terms of omitting the main 
determinant of equilibrium real exchange rate for Turkey, namely, government spending. 
They use a bilateral exchange rate (vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar), instead of the effective 
exchange rate, when Turkey’s main trading partner is Germany. In addition, they use the 
actual values of the fundamentals to construct the equilibrium exchange rate. While 
Dordoodian, Jung and Yucel (2002) use a theoretical model similar to ours, they use a 
dated econometric technique, moving-average method as used by Edwards (1989) to 
estimate the long run equilibrium. Using PPP in a non-linear model, Sarno (2000) finds 
that the real Turkish lira adjusts non-linearly towards its equilibrium level for the period 
1980-97. Using a time varying parameter model, Ozlale and Yeldan (2002) find that lira 
remained structurally undervalued for most of 2000. Their estimation suffers from 
misspecification of the model, which ignores the impact of terms of trade and 
productivity increases on the real exchange rate. In addition, they estimate the 
equilibrium real exchange rate by multiplying the coefficient vector with the actual 
values of the regressors. This includes both the temporary and the permanent components 
in the regressors, which by definition, is not the equilibrium. Using a structural VAR 
model, Erlat and Erlat (1998) find that real shocks explain the fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate, and once displaced from the equilibrium, it takes about 3 – 4 years for the 
real and nominal exchange rates to return to the equilibrium value. However, this model 
does not explicitly estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate. Due to the shortcomings 
in the previous studies, our paper attempts to improve on the existing literature by 
accounting for all the long run and the short run variables that affect real exchange rates 
and by estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate, where only the permanent 
components of the long run fundamentals are included.  
   5
4. Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
We use the models developed by Montiel (1997), Edwards (1989, 1994) and 
Elbadawi (1994) to determine the real fundamentals affecting the long-run real exchange 
rate. The equilibrium real exchange rate is one that is consistent with simultaneous 
internal and external balance. The predictions from these models are summarized below:
4 
•  Composition of government spending:  If government spending is directed mainly 
toward traded goods and services, the trade balance deteriorates. To bring the external 
balance in equilibrium, the REER must depreciate (expected sign is negative). 
Conversely, spending directed mainly toward non-traded goods and services 
generates excess demand in the non-traded sector. To restore the sectoral balance, 
there must be an appreciation of the REER (expected sign is positive).  
•  Terms of trade: If terms of trade deterioration shifts the demand away from 
importables and into the nontradables, this would put an upward pressure on the real 
exchange rate, hence we would expect a negative sign. On the other hand, if the 
income effect from the terms of trade deterioration dominates the substitution effect, 
we would expect a depreciation of the real exchange rate and hence a positive sign.    
•  As exchange and trade controls in the economy decrease, the demand for imports 
leads to external and internal imbalances, which require real depreciation to correct 
them. Using the ratio of import tariff revenue to imports as the proxy for exchange 
and trade controls, as trade barriers are reduced (a reduction in the value of this 
proxy), the total amount of trade will increase. Accordingly, a reduction in controls 
should be associated with real depreciation, and the expected sign is positive. If, 
however, the share of exports plus imports in the GDP is used as a proxy for 
openness, then a reduction in trade barriers will be associated with higher trade, 
requiring a real depreciation (negative sign).
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•  The long-run effect of a reduction in capital controls is ambiguous.
6  The reduction in 
capital controls is equivalent to a decrease in the tax on foreign borrowing that 
generates a positive wealth effect, which increases consumption in all periods. Hence, 
an appreciation is required (positive sign) for equilibrium to hold. On the other hand, 
by the intertemporal substitution effect, future consumption is lower than present 
consumption, which exerts a downward pressure on the future (long-run) price of 
non-tradables, and hence a depreciation of the REER is required (negative sign). The 
overall sign of the equilibrium depends on which effect dominates. 
•  Technological progress (Balassa-Samuelson): Higher differential productivity 
growth in the traded goods sector leads to increased demand and higher real wages 
for labor in that sector. The traded goods sector expands, causing an incipient trade 
surplus. To restore both internal and external balance, the relative price of non-traded 
goods must rise (REER appreciation). 
•  Investment in the economy: According to Edwards, when investment is included in 
the theoretical model, the intertemporal analysis includes supply-side effects that 
depend on the relative ordering of factor intensities across sectors. Therefore, the sign 
on the exchange rate in response to increased investment is ambiguous. 
In addition to the long-run relationship, we consider some of the macroeconomic 
policies that result in overvaluation of the domestic currency, that is, short-run 
misalignments. We use Edwards’ proxies for “inconsistent” macroeconomic policies –   6
expansionary policies lead to appreciation of the exchange rate -- reflecting a mounting 
disequilibrium or real exchange rate overvaluation. These variables are included in the 
short-run part of the specification as all the crises in Turkey have been caused mainly by 
expansionary policies and severe balance of payments problems. We test this model 
empirically in the next section.  
 
5. Empirical Model: Estimation and Results 
 
The model discussed above is estimated using an error correction model (ECM), 
which captures the common stochastic trend among the non-stationary series and the 
deviations of each variable from its equilibrium.
7 The variables used in the analysis are 
described in the appendix. The dependent variable for our models is the log of the real 
effective exchange rate, which is a trade-weighted index calculated by the IMF. The 
ECM includes all the long run determinants of the real exchange rate (from theoretical 
model) and a set of exogenous variables that are thought to contribute to the short-run 
misalignment. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the 
models.  
In order to estimate the error correction models, all of the fundamentals are 
examined for unit roots. The lag length is determined using the Schwartz Criterion and 
Akaike Criterion. Unit test results are reported in Table 2. Standard unit root tests reveal 
that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for the real exchange rate nor for 
any of its long-run fundamentals and the index of political confidence, but that it can be 
rejected for the current account, excess credit, the fiscal balance to high powered money 
and the first difference of the index of political confidence. Only the Phillips-Perron test 
rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root for technological progress, exchange controls and 
the Balassa-Samuelson variable. Given that the unit root tests suffer from lack of power, 
a researcher is likely to find spurious relationships if the variables are assumed to be 
stationary when in fact they are not. Hence, it is more conservative to assume that the 
variables are nonstationary even if they are not (Saxena (2000)). We proceed with our 
analysis on the assumption that all the long-run fundamentals are indeed non-stationary.   
To estimate the error correction model, the series are first tested for cointegration. 
The results from cointegration test using the method of Johansen (1991) are reported in 
Table 3. The lag length for the error correction model is determined by backward 
selection, beginning at a lag length of four to economize on degrees of freedom. The 
likelihood ratio test indicates that an error correction model with two lags is the most 
appropriate specification. The cointegration results indicate one cointegrating vector.  
We estimate five error correction models in order to test the robustness of our 
results. Models 1 and 3 are estimated with only the long run fundamentals and we add the 
short run fundamentals in Models 2 and 4. Hence, Models 1 and 2 include tariff revenues 
as a measure of exchange controls, while Models 3 and 4 incorporate the variable 
openness. All these models show very consistent results. An increase in government 
consumption leads to a real appreciation, as conventional wisdom suggests since a higher 
proportion of government spending is directed towards non-traded goods. A decrease in 
exchange and trade controls lead to a real depreciation. An increase in investment is 
associated with a real appreciation (except in Model 1 where it is insignificant). A 
decrease in capital controls leads to an increase in capital inflows, which causes a real   7
depreciation in the long run, suggesting that the intertemporal substitution effect 
dominates the income effect. A deterioration in the terms of trade shifts the demand away 
from importables to non-tradables leading to a real appreciation – implying that the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect.
8 This is consistent with the finding in 
Kipici (1996) that the substitution effect dominates the income effect for Turkey, which 
implies that the consumption-tilting motive dominates the consumption-smoothing 
motive.  
The more puzzling result is regarding the technological progress. According to all 
the four models, technological progress leads to a depreciated real exchange rate. We 
suspect that the proxy for technological progress (the rate of growth of industrial 
production index) is a bad one. It is a well-known fact that Balassa-Samuelson variable is 
a relative-relative price, i.e., it captures the relative price of traded goods to non-traded 
goods, relative to the relative prices in the trading partners’ economies. Hence, if 
productivity in Turkey’s tradable sector (proxied by manufacturing sector growth) grows 
faster than the non-tradable sector and this outpaces the relative productivity growth in its 
trading partners’ economies, the price of non-tradables rises in Turkey causing the 
Turkish lira to appreciate in real terms. However, Ghosh (2002) notes that the faster 
growth in manufacturing productivity affects the equilibrium real exchange rate through 
another channel. If countries’ exports are assumed to be imperfect substitutes, then 
standard trade models imply that an increase in supply will require a lower relative price. 
In this case, a faster growth in Turkey’s manufacturing productivity will lower its relative 
price, implying a depreciation in the equilibrium real exchange rate. Hence, we include a 
measure of Balassa-Samuelson effect and Turkey’s relative manufacturing productivity 
instead of technological progress in Model 5.
9 The results indicate that an increase in the 
Balassa-Samuelson variable (the relative-relative price) appreciates the equilibrium real 
exchange rate (although insignificantly), while an increase in Turkey’s manufacturing 
productivity (relative to its trading partners) depreciates the equilibrium exchange rate. 
Most of the other results remain the same, except that the signs on the terms of trade and 
exchange control reverse, but become insignificant. Hence, the variable technological 
progress seems to be capturing the growth in Turkey’s manufacturing sector relative to its 
trading partners, which leads to a depreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate.   
 We include the short-run fundamentals in Models 2 and 4. We started with four 
lags of all the short-run variables and arrived at the final specification by deleting the 
insignificant lags. Here again the results are consistent across the models. Like Edwards 
(1989), expansionary fiscal policy (i.e., an increase in budget deficits) leads to an 
appreciated real exchange rate, which signifies an exchange rate misalignment. This is 
consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model with capital mobility – where expansionary 
fiscal policy leads to a balance of payments surplus and hence an appreciation of the 
exchange rate.
10 Unlike Edwards (1989), expansionary monetary policy (domestic credit 
creation) leads to a depreciated exchange rate. In Edwards’ model, an increase in 
domestic credit led to an increase in domestic prices, which along with a fixed exchange 
rate, led to a real appreciation. However, in Turkey, the effects of expansionary monetary 
policies have been offset by the continuous depreciation of the nominal effective 
exchange rate. As the current account balance improves, the real exchange rate 
appreciates. An improvement in the confidence in the economy depreciates the real 
exchange rate. At first the result may seem counter-intuitive. We believe that this   8
connection is operating through the capital inflows. An increase in the confidence in the 
economy encourages short term capital inflows. But shortly thereafter, this short term 
debt may appear unsustainable which causes the real exchange rate to depreciate.   
We take Model 2 as the baseline model to construct the equilibrium real exchange 
rate. This model is preferred over Model 4 because of its higher explanatory power and 
significant long run fundamentals.  
 
6. Estimating the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate 
 
The main aim of this paper is to estimate the Turkish equilibrium exchange rate to 
gauge the extent of overvaluation of the real exchange rate at the time of the crises in 
1994 and 2001. In addition, we want to assess any misalignment that may still exist. We 
now turn to estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate. As we have noted in the 
literature review, earlier studies have estimated the equilibrium real exchange rate using 
the actual values of the fundamentals, which contains the temporary components of these 
fundamentals. To exclude the temporary components, Edwards (1989) uses the 
Beveridge-Nelson decomposition to estimate the permanent component of each long run 
determinant. But this methodology ignores the relationship that is estimated through an 
error correction model. Hence, we use the methodology proposed by Gonzalo and 
Granger (1995) that uses the joint information in the error correction system to construct 
the permanent components of the endogenous variables.
11  
Chart 1 depicts the actual and the equilibrium real exchange rate for Turkey from 
1982Q1 to 2003Q1. We observe an overvaluation of more than 10% in 1993Q4 and 25% 
in 2000Q4. The depreciation in the aftermath of the 1994 crisis led to an overshooting of 
the real exchange rate, but the depreciation after 2000 has led to a movement in the actual 
real exchange rate towards the equilibrium, eliminating the misalignment in 2002Q3. The 
actual real exchange rate is close to the equilibrium now, hence exposing the myth 
propagated by the Turkish exporters that the lira is overvalued.
12  
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications  
 
Our main aim in the paper is to estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate for 
Turkey. The literature review demonstrates that while papers have been written about the 
equilibrium real exchange rate in Turkey, they suffer from a serious shortcoming – they 
all use actual values of the fundamentals, which contain their own temporary 
components. In this paper, we estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate for Turkey 
using the correct methodology and find that the Turkish lira was overvalued before the 
crises in 1994 and 2001. However, this overvaluation has been eliminated and the actual 
real exchange rate is close to its equilibrium value now.  
Our results have obvious policy implications. Our results show that budget 
deficits appreciate the exchange rate, leading to overvaluation. This result confirms the 
role of fiscal adjustment in restoring macroeconomic stability – a result consistent with 
Agenor, McDermott and Ucer (1997) and Kale (2001). In the past, Turkish policymakers 
have used discrete nominal devaluations to maintain the competitiveness of the Turkish 
exports. But this quick-fix policy has ignored the role for fiscal discipline in 
macroeconomic stability. Continued budget deficits have led to misaligned exchange rate,   9
which has led to the collapse of the lira twice in the past 10 years. While Turkish lira has 
been floating since the last crisis in 2001, yet claims that the lira is overvalued call for 
policy interventions. In fact, our results show that the actual real exchange rate is very 
close to its equilibrium level now implying that policies will better serve to improve the 
competitiveness of Turkish exports when focused on fundamentals such as productivity 
increases rather than temporary solutions of nominal devaluations.  
Our results have implications for Turkey’s current monetary policy of implicit 
inflation targeting. Given the history of past inflationary experiences, this new policy 
framework can help bring inflationary expectations down. Given that such a policy would 
require the central bank to give up monitoring exchange rate, the success would depend 
on the extent of pass-through from exchange rate to inflation. While there has been a 
recent decrease in the extent of exchange rate pass through to prices in Turkey (Airaudo, 
2004), the relationship between the two is likely to change once inflation targeting 
reduces inflationary expectations. Indeed, Taylor (2000) argues that during high inflation, 
firms pass on their cost increases to consumers, but do the opposite during low inflation. 
Hence, the successful implementation of inflation targeting regime in Turkey would 
break the link between depreciations and inflation.  
The successful implementation of inflation targeting policy requires an 
independent central bank and the absence of fiscal dominance. The latter requires fiscal 
discipline to deal with Turkey’s economic problems rather than just devaluing the 
currency.  Since 2001, Turkey has had an average positive primary surplus around 5% of 
GDP and the debt to GDP ratio has been improving too (Airaudo, 2004). Such 
improvements in fiscal stance support the independence of the central bank, which in turn 
increases the likelihood of a successful inflation targeting policy framework.    10
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APPENDIX:  Data Sources and Construction 
 




1.  LREER = Ln(REER) 
 
2.  LGCONGDP = Ln(GCON/GDP) 
 
3.  LTOT = Ln(TOT) 
 
4.  LOPEN = Ln(X + M / GDP) 
 
5.  LINVGDP = Ln(INV/GDP) 
 
6.  TECHPRO = Ln(IPI/IPI -4) 
 
7.  LEXCHCONTROL = Ln(CUSTREV/M) 
 
8.  CAPCONTROL = (CAPINFLOW/GDP)-1 
 
9.  GBALHPM = GBAL/HPMONEY-1 
 
10. EXCREDIT = ∆Ln(DOMCREDIT) - ∆Ln(GDP)-1 
 











t tradeweigh , where i = Turkey’s main six trading partners, i.e., 
Germany, United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan. 
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6 In the short-run, both the substitution and the income effect of capital inflows lead to an appreciation.  
7 For testable implications of the intertemporal model, refer to Saxena (2000). 
8 This is inconsistent with the empirical regularity that a deterioration in the terms of trade is associated 
with a real depreciation.  
9 The construction of these variables follows Ghosh (2002).  
10 Agenor, McDermott and Ucer (1997) also find that a positive shock to government spending leads to an 
appreciation of the temporary component of the real exchange rate.    
11 To conserve space, we refer the readers to Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and Saxena (2000) for the 
description of the methodology. This methodology has been used in Alberola, et al (1999), Cerra and 
Saxena (2002) and Saxena (2002) to estimate equilibrium real exchange rates. 
12 In order to conserve space, we have eliminated the charts for the forecasts of the real exchange rate, 
which perform very well, as in Cerra and Saxena (2002). Those results are available upon request from the 
authors.  